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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of real estate transparency (RET) 
on foreign real estate investments (FREI). Most of the previous studies have argued that the free 
flow of information and the fair and consistent application of local property laws could attract greater 
amounts of FREI. Using observations from 32 countries covering 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 and ap-
plying fixed-effect and the generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques, our empirical results 
reveal that RET is not a major determinant of FREI. However, we find that the effect of RET on FREI 
is dependent on its interaction with the level of income implying that the higher the level of income in 
the host country, the higher the effect of RET on FREI. Finally, the results show that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in other sector, market size and property prices are important determinants of FREI.
KEYWORDS: Real estate transparency; Foreign real estate investments; Income; Property prices; 
Panel data 
1. INTRODUCTION
A transparent real estate market is a market fair-
ly free from corruption and it has readily available 
information and operates in a fair and consistent 
manner (JLL1 2006). In other words, a transpar-
ent real estate market is completely open and 
clearly organized, operates in a legal and regula-
tory framework characterized by a consistent ap-
proach to the enforcement of published rules and 
planning regulations, respects private property 
rights and has relatively low transaction and in-
formation costs (Triantafyllopoulos 2006).  
Several observers argue that the higher level 
of real estate transparency (RET) attracts greater 
amounts of foreign real estate investments (FREI) 
(e.g. Schulte et al. 2005; JLL 2006, 2010). It is be-
cause RET is a powerful incentive for encourag-
1 Jones Lang LaSalle is a financial and professional services 
firm specializing in real estate services and investment ma-
nagement. 
ing the free flow of information and the fair and 
consistent application of local property laws (JLL 
2010). Therefore, transparent markets can create 
confidence and be attractive to domestic and inter-
national investors (Schulte et al. 2005). 
However, investors’ interest in less transparent 
markets like Japan, China and Mexico is rising 
rapidly (JLL 2006). JLL (2008, 2010) noted that 
high levels of transparency do not eliminate risks 
for investors and guarantee a strong investment 
return. JLL (2008) also shows that the association 
between the level of transparency and the growth 
in cross-border real estate transaction volumes is 
not strong. For example, Japan and South Korea 
recorded solid increases in cross-border real estate 
transaction volumes in 2006–2007, in spite of mini-
mal improvements in RET (JLL 2008). It is argued 
that rather than transparency enhancements be-
ing the key determinant of capital flows, property 
market fundamentals are the main driving force 
behind cross-border transactions. In other words, 
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foreign investors in property sector may not appre-
ciate the transparent market while they stress re-
turns on capital and other property market factors.
Yet we do not know the impact of RET on 
FREI. We explore our hypothesis using a panel of 
32 countries for 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. This 
study contributes to the existing literature in sev-
eral ways. First, while there has been a series of 
conceptual, qualitative and descriptive papers pub-
lished in this area (e.g. Triantafyllopoulos 2006; 
D’Arcy 2009; Adair et al. 2006), very few empiri-
cal works have examined the effect of RET on 
FREI by applying a panel data approach. Panel 
data give more informative data, more variability, 
less co-linearity among the variables, more degree 
of freedom and more efficiency. With additional, 
more informative data researchers can produce 
more reliable parameter estimates (Baltagi 2005). 
Second, while FREI is a large component of FDI in 
services, currently there are very few analyses of 
determinants of FREI across a broad set of coun-
tries. Third, our paper is the first attempt to utilize 
the Jones Lang LaSalle’s Real Estate Transpar-
ency Index in a FREI study. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides some stylized facts for the RET and FREI 
in the countries under study. Section 3 reviews 
some of the relevant studies. In Section 4, besides 
the RET, we identify the factors that will be rel-
evant for our econometric investigation, drawing 
from the empirical and theoretical literature. In 
Section 5, we specify the empirical model, explain 
the methodology and present the results. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.
2. REAL ESTATE TRANSPARENCY AND 
FOREIGN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS: 
STYLIZED FACTS
This section sets the scene for the empirical analy-
sis that follows by presenting some stylized facts 
for RET and FREI. 
Over the period of study (2004–2010), most of 
the countries demonstrated improvement in RET. 
Figure 1 clearly depicts the RET improvement in 
most of the sample countries. The improvement in 
RET was related to the forces of globalization. The 
movement of capital and corporations around the 
world has created a growing need for information 
about markets. It has also created an incentive for 
governments to streamline bureaucratic practices 
that hinder the free flow of capital (JLL 2008). 
Similarly, the real estate sector has been expe-
riencing significant movement toward greater in-
ternationalization. Evidence of this trend is reflect-
ed by the fact that in recent years there has been 
rapid growth in direct real estate investments and 
portfolio investments in the listed real estate se-
curities (Topintzi et al. 2008; UNCTAD 2007). For 
example, statistics show that foreign real estate 
investments have accounted for 37% of the world’s 
wealth (Brown, Matysiak 2000). Cross border in-
vestments account for 63% of total transaction vol-
umes in Europe real estate markets (JLL 2007). 
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FDI flows into China’s real estate market accounts 
for 10–15% of the total FDI from the middle of the 
1990s to 2009 (He et al. 2009). Foreign real estate 
investment in Spain represents nearly 40% of to-
tal FDI inflows (Rodríguez, Bustillo 2010). More 
evidences on the recent surges of FREI in some 
countries under study can be seen in Appendix A. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Several researchers have studied the relation-
ship between RET and FREI. The conclusions are 
contradictory: one set of researchers support a 
positive relationship between RET and FREI (e.g. 
Eichholtz et al. 2011; Falkenbach 2009; Schulte 
et al. 2005) and the second view argues that the 
relationship is negative or insignificant (e.g. JLL 
2008, 2006). This section of paper intends to sur-
vey the arguments from some studies supporting 
each of these viewpoints.
JLL (2008) noted that uncertainty respecting 
foreign real estate investment laws could weaken 
investor confidence, caused confusion, negatively 
affected transparency and as a result decrease 
foreign direct investment in property sector. Simi-
larly, JLL (2004) argued foreign real estate inves-
tors are not keen to invest in countries where do-
mestic investors have easier access to information 
and therefore a competitive advantage, since the 
costs and risks of property transactions are high. 
JLL (2009a) argued improved transparency is im-
portant for investors because transparent markets 
allow for better risk management and the estab-
lishment of suitable risk premiums, the assess-
ment of likely future investment returns through 
performance benchmarks. Transparent real estate 
markets also provide for enhanced decision-making 
through better information and the development of 
more robust and informed investment strategies 
and target allocations. 
Eichholtz et al. (2011) found that internation-
al property companies mainly invest in countries 
that have relatively high scores on transparency. 
More specifically, they argued that the increased 
transparency reduces the information asymmetry 
problems (or reduce the information disadvantages) 
which it can improve foreign property companies’ 
performance compared to those companies that 
operate locally. Furthermore, their results show 
that the institutional environment and the level of 
economic integration affect significantly on perfor-
mance of international property companies. Eich-
holtz et al. (2001) stated that international inves-
tors always face a trade-off between diversification 
benefits and information costs. If information costs 
are so high that all potential benefits of interna-
tional diversification are mitigated, international 
investment may then not occur. Dhar and Goetz-
mann (2006) documented that more complete in-
formation about the long-term performance of real 
estate asset class can help resolve uncertainty and 
affect institutional investors’ demand for different 
types of properties. Geurts and Jaffe (1996) argued 
that imperfect information about the institutional 
framework leads to the home asset bias2. In other 
words, when information regarding the institution-
al framework is imperfect, the institutional risk of 
investing in a foreign country would be higher than 
international portfolio diversification benefits (e.g. 
reduction in unsystematic risk). He et al. (2009) 
provided evidences that foreign investors would 
favor those China’s provinces with a more trans-
parent real estate markets. More specifically, they 
argued that provinces that transfer their land use 
rights through a more open and transparent way 
would be attractive to foreign real estate investors 
and developers. Further, they found that foreign 
real estate investors avoid high labor cost provinces 
and high financing cost but significantly favor prov-
inces with higher housing prices, developed land 
and housing commercialization, good governance, 
strong law enforcement and developed services. 
Falkenbach (2009) found that one of the important 
criteria for market selection in international real 
estate investments is availability of market infor-
mation and performance benchmarks. In addition, 
their results indicated that the most important fac-
tors for market selection are expected return on 
property investments and safety of property rights 
and title. Triantafyllopoulos (2006) argued where 
there is no security of legal title and enforceabil-
ity of property rights, domestic and international 
investors are not always willing to invest. Trian-
tafyllopoulos further discussed that lack of infor-
mation regarding real assets may cause a country 
to be ignored by real estate investors when they 
draw up their international investment strategies. 
Triantafyllopoulos also noted that when corruption 
dominates in property markets, the private mar-
ginal product of capital invested decrease because 
of the bribes that have to be paid, lowering the in-
vestment rate. As a result, participation of domes-
tic and foreign investors in property market would 
decrease. In his analysis of internationalization 
2 Home asset bias: Investors seem to bias their investments 
towards the domestic country, despite the prospects of sig-
nificant gains to diversifying internationally (Geurts, Jaffe 
1996). 
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of real estate involvements in European markets, 
D’Arcy (2009) noted that considerable improve-
ment in real estate transparency could contribute 
to the expansion of cross-border real estate capital 
flows in this region. Schulte et al. (2005) concluded 
that the more transparent the German real estate 
market, the more professional market participants 
have to behave correctly and the more interesting 
the market would become for foreign investors. In 
other words, transparent real estate markets pro-
vide as much information as possible for all market 
participants and therefore minimize the informa-
tion advantages of other market participants. Lee 
(2001) showed that institutional real estate inves-
tors choose to invest in the most transparent, ma-
ture and least corrupt markets. He argued that if 
investors can become more informed of the insti-
tutional structures and business practices of over-
seas markets they are more likely to invest in those 
markets. Gelos and Wei (2002) found that there is 
relatively clear evidence that low transparency (or 
high opacity) tends to depress the level of interna-
tional investments. In their study on Central and 
Eastern European economies, Adair et al. (2006) 
concluded those locations that possess transparent 
property market data have a competitive advantage 
and are more likely to attract investment funds. In 
his study on transparency in the Chinese’ real es-
tate development industry, Han (2005) found that 
more transparent a Chinese company, the more 
possible a successful joint venture with foreign in-
vestors. 
With regard to aggregate FDI (including FDI 
in real estate), Drabek and Payne (2002) showed 
a nation that takes steps to increase the degree of 
transparency in its policies and institutions could 
expect significant increases in the level of foreign 
investment. Likewise, Seyoum and Manyak (2009) 
examined the role of public and private transpar-
ency in attracting inward FDI flows to developing 
countries. Their empirical analysis indicated that 
private and public sectors transparency have posi-
tive and significant effect on FDI inflows. Seyoum 
(2009) also found that foreign firms are willing to 
invest in developing countries with high levels of 
corporate transparency (e.g. adopting international 
financial reporting standards, increasing the level 
of disclosures to investors) because it increases 
their ability to accurately evaluate company per-
formance. Egger and Winner (2003) found a posi-
tive impact of the viability of contracts and market 
size on FDI stock. 
Apart from the above-mentioned works, some 
studies found (or argued) that RET does not 
have a significant impact on FREI. For exam-
ple, JLL (2006) showed that investors’ interest in 
less transparent markets like Japan, China and 
Mexico is rising rapidly. A report provided by JLL 
(2010) suggested that high level of transparency 
do not eliminate risks for investors or occupiers. 
JLL (2008) also showed that the association be-
tween the levels of transparency and the growth 
in cross-border real estate transaction volumes is 
not strong. For example, Japan and South Korea 
recorded solid increases in cross-border real estate 
transaction volumes in 2006–2007, in spite of mini-
mal improvements in RET (JLL 2008). It is argued 
that rather than transparency enhancements be-
ing the key determinant of capital flows, property 
market fundamentals are the main driving force 
Table 1. Review of the literature on real estate transparency and foreign investments
Study Subject of investigation Approach Relevant findings 
Qualitative Studies
JLL (2004, 2006, 2008) Real estate transparency Reports RET has positive impact on FREI.
Triantafyllopoulos (2006) Market and institutional
constraints regarding real 
estate investments 
Conceptual paper  RET attracts real estate investors. 
Adair et al. (2006) Real estate transparency in 
Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries 
Conceptual paper Those locations that possess trans-
parent property market data have a 
competitive advantage and are more 
likely to attract investment funds. 
D’Arcy (2009) The evolution of institutional 
arrangements to support the 
internationalization of real 
estate involvements in Euro-
pean markets
 Conceptual paper RET contributes to the expansion of 
cross-border real estate capital flows. 
JLL (2006, 2008, 2010) Real Estate Transparency Reports Not strong relationship between RET 
and FREI.
(Continued)
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Study Subject of investigation Approach Relevant findings 
Empirical Studies
(Continued)
Eichholtz et al. (2011) Transparency, integration, 
and the cost of international 
real estate investments




Property companies mainly invest in 
countries that have relatively a trans-
parent real estate market. 
Seyoum and Manyak 
(2009) 
Public and private sector 
transparency and FDI in 
developing countries 
Cross sectional 




Positive impact of public and private 
sector transparency on FDI.
He et al. (2009) Determinants of FDI in Chi-
na’s real estate sector 
Panel data regres-
sions, using data 
from provinces of 
China (2000–2007)
The significant determinants are: 
financing cost, labor cost housing 
prices, land and housing commer-
cialization, regional governance, law 
enforcement and developed services.
Falkenbach (2009) Market selection for inter-
national real estate invest-
ments
Survey study The important factors for market se-
lection are Safety of property rights 
and title, expected return on property 
investments, describing institutional 
set-up and market maturity. 
Seyoum (2009) Impact of corporate trans-
parency on FDI
Cross sectional anal-
ysis – OLS regres-
sion (118 countries, 
2003–2006)  
Foreign firms are willing to invest in 
developing countries with high levels 
of corporate transparency.   
Dhar and Goetzmann 
(2006)
Institutional perspectives on 
real estate investing: the role 
of risk and uncertainty
Survey study Complete information about the long-
term performance of real estate asset 
class can help resolve uncertainty and 
affect institutional investors’ demand 
for different types of properties. 
Schulte et al. (2005) Transparency in the German 
real estate market 
Descriptive analysis The more transparent the German 
real estate market, the more profes-
sional market participants have to 
behave correctly and the more inter-
esting the market would become for 
foreign investors.
Han (2005) Creating transparency in 
China’s real estate sector  
Descriptive analysis More transparent a Chinese com-
pany, the more possible a successful 
joint venture with foreign investors. 
Egger and Winner (2005) Evidence on corruption as an 
incentive for FDI
Panel data regres-
sion (73 countries, 
1995–1999)  
Corruption is a stimulus for FDI.
Egger and Winner (2003) Contract risk and FDI Panel data regres-
sion, (50 countries, 
1985–1997)   
Positive impact of the viability of con-
tracts on FDI.
Gelos and Wei (2002) Transparency and interna-
tional investor behavior 
Regression analysis Low transparency depresses the level 
of international investments. 
Drabek and Payne (2002) Transparency and FDI 2SLS regression (52 
countries, 1992–
1995)  
Positive relationship between trans-
parency and FDI
Lee (2001) The risks of investing in the 
real estate markets of the 
Asian region
Descriptive analysis 
of risk and return  
Institutional real estate investors 
choose to invest in the most transpar-
ent, mature and least corrupt mar-
kets. 
Eichholtz et al. (2001) Trade-off between diversifi-
cation benefits and informa-
tion costs




High information costs reduce inter-
national investments. 
Geurts and Jaffe (1996) Risk and international real 
estate investment
Correlation analysis Imperfect information reduces foreign 
investments. 
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behind cross-border transaction volumes. Regard-
ing aggregate FDI, Egger and Winner (2005) found 
that corruption is a stimulus for FDI because cor-
ruption can be beneficial in circumventing regu-
latory and administrative restrictions. Since, real 
estate and property sector is seen to bribe offi-
cials most frequently (Transparency International 
2008), therefore, we could expect that higher level 
of transparency in real estate sector may discour-
age FREI. 
As the literature review reveals, findings of 
prior studies are contradictory and inconclusive. 
Given past empirical research, a positive, negative 
or insignificant coefficient is expected for the RET 
variable. Table 1 presents a summary of the most 
important findings of the relevant qualitative and 
empirical studies.  
4. DATA AND VARIABLES  
We use observations from 32 countries3 covering 
2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Included are all coun-
tries for which data on RET and FREI is obtain-
able. The relationship between RET and FREI is 
our main concern. 
Information on countries’ RET is taken from 
the Jones Lang LaSalle/LaSalle (JLL) Invest-
ment Management Real Estate Transparency In-
dex. JLL introduced the first Global Real Estate 
Transparency Index in 1999 in order to character-
ize the relative transparency of key global real es-
tate markets. It should be noted that JLL provides 
global real estate transparency index every two 
years. JLL defines real estate transparency “as 
any open and clearly organized real estate mar-
ket operating in a legal and regulatory framework 
that is characterized by a consistent approach to 
the enforcement of rules and regulations and that 
respects private property rights”. In 2006, they 
added a new dimension to this definition: “the 
ethical and professional standards of private sec-
tor advisors, agents and brokers who are licensed 
to conduct business in each country” (JLL 2006: 3). 
On the other hand, an opaque real estate market 
is a market that has the following characteristics: 
absence of financial benchmarks, lack of historical 
or current market statistics on supply, demand or 
rent; financial statements of listed vehicles that 
are neither detailed nor standardized according to 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)/
international accounting standards (IAS); real es-
tate tax procedures and building and zoning codes 
3 The country sample can be found in the Appendix B.
that are not published or are selectively enforced; 
situations where local assistance or under-the-
table payments are required to navigate the in-
vestment/development/management process; lack 
of title records or title insurance; environments 
in which government or public utilities acquire 
private property on short notice, introducing risk 
that owners will not be fairly compensated (JLL 
2004: 2). The index is calculated by using a neu-
tral weighting. The scores range between 1 and 5. 
A country with a perfect 1 would be the country 
with the highest level of transparency. A country 
with a 5 would be a country with total opacity. In 
order to facilitate the interpretation of this index, 
we have reversed the scores (1: total opacity and 
5: the highest level of transparency).
The data on real FDI inflows to real estate sec-
tor (FREI) is obtained from a wide range of sources. 
The complete FREI data sources can be found in 
Appendix B. FREI includes selling or buying real 
estate, renting real estate, providing other real es-
tate services such as appraising real estate by for-
eign individuals and enterprises, whenever these 
foreigners do not maintain a permanent residence 
in the host country. The definition of FREI is al-
most identical for most of the sample countries. It 
is measured in millions of US dollars. Following 
Kolstad and Villanger (2008) we have adjusted for 
country size by dividing FREI by its population.  
Besides the RET, we observe that some vari-
ables show the persistent influence on FREI. Thus, 
for the purpose of specification of the econometric 
work, several explanatory variables, besides RET, 
are added to our empirical model. Above all, mar-
ket size in host country is one of the important 
factors in explaining FREI. UNCTAD (2003) em-
phasizes that some of foreign investors invest in 
developing countries mainly to introduce their real 
estate activities into the host countries. Foreign 
investors in a country’s real estate pay close atten-
tion to the size of local market for marketing their 
final goods which is real estate. A very common 
proxy to measure the capacity of local market to 
buy the final product is the real income per cap-
ita. A higher GDP per capita of residents of host 
country indicates a higher effective demand for the 
kinds of goods and services produced by foreign 
investors. It also captures potential economies of 
large-scale production such as in real estate sector. 
For example, He et al. (2009) argued that a higher 
level of GDP per capita in China would create a 
higher demand for real estate properties, there-
fore attracting more FDI in the real estate indus-
try (as more local demands and larger market size 
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would create higher revenues for foreign real es-
tate investors). Rodríguez and Bustillo (2010) also 
showed that GDP per capita (as the purchasing 
power of the consumer of real estate services) has 
the strongest effect on foreign real estate invest-
ments. Falkenbach (2009) documented that mar-
ket size is an important factor in attracting foreign 
investors to the host country’s real estate market 
(because market size reflects availability of invest-
ment possibilities). Based on previous studies, it is 
hypothesized that market size is a significant de-
terminant of FREI. Following Chakrabarti (2001) 
and Kolstad and Villanger (2008), GDP per capita 
is used as a proxy for market size in the present 
study. The data on the real GDP per capita come 
from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
In prior studies, infrastructure was recognized 
as one of the main determinants of FREI. For ex-
ample, Ramasamy and Yeung (2010) showed a 
positive and significant result proving that coun-
tries that have an established infrastructure would 
attract greater amounts of FDI in service sectors 
(including real estate). Renaud (2010) argued that 
infrastructure development was one of the major 
factors that attract foreign investors in Dubai’s 
real estate sector. Chin et al. (2006) also found 
that level of public infrastructure is one of the im-
portant factors for property investors in Southeast 
Asian cities’ real estate markets. Lall et al. (2003) 
showed that the level of development of the physi-
cal infrastructure had a positive impact on the 
level of long-term foreign direct investment in the 
Caribbean and Latin America regions. UNCTAD 
(2004) stated the upgrading of the physical infra-
structure (especially in information and commu-
nication technology) was required by most foreign 
investors in order to perform needed services. In 
our study, internet user (per 100 people) is used as 
a proxy for country’s infrastructure. Information 
on this variable is taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Internet can in-
crease productivity of foreign investors in several 
ways. Internet can reduce prices by lowering in-
ternational communication and searching costs. It 
also makes entry to markets easier by reducing 
the entry costs. Both reductions in search and en-
try costs will increase competition and we observe 
increasing productivity in competitive markets. In 
addition, internet can reduce the cost of holding in-
ventories through direct contact of large suppliers 
with customer, cutting the costs of working with 
retailers. This latter issue also increases produc-
tivity. Finally, the transparency and flow of infor-
mation among markets is higher when a country 
enjoys a higher degree of internet penetration (for 
an empirical investigation of effect of internet on 
FDI see Choi 2003).  
Another determinant of FREI is the financing 
costs in the host countries. It is because foreign 
investors in service sectors (including real estate) 
rely on the host country’s financial systems to raise 
the capital that is required for their investment 
(Ramasamy, Yeung 2010). Therefore, a high inter-
est rate could negatively influence the extent of 
FDI inflow because a large amount of funds could 
be raised by foreign investors from the financial 
system of the host countries. This argument is con-
sistent with a number of previous studies. He et al. 
(2009) found that foreign investors in China’s real 
estate industry avoid provinces with high financ-
ing cost (or lower value for loan). This means that 
foreign investors favor locations in which foreign 
investors are easy to borrow money from commer-
cial banks. In their study on determinants of FREI 
in Spain, Rodríguez and Bustillo (2010) also found 
that FREI is negatively related to the long-term 
interest rate. With regard to aggregate FDI, Zhao 
(2003) found that the relatively high costs of capi-
tal borrowing in China inhibited the flow of FDI. 
Based on the above discussion, one would expect 
that the lower financing cost in the host countries 
would attract greater amount of FREI. The data 
on the annual lending rates (proxy for financing 
cost) come from International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), International Financial Statistics. 
Furthermore, existing literature present evi-
dences that FDI inflows to other sectors has a 
significant effect on FREI. It is expected that as 
the foreign investors (in manufacturing and ser-
vices sector) expand their operations in the host 
country, their demand for investments in real 
estate in that host country will increase as well. 
Moshirian and Pham (2000) found that U.S. FDI 
in real estate abroad is positively correlated with 
U.S. FDI in manufacturing and banking abroad. In 
other words, their results implied that expansion 
of U.S. investment in the form of manufacturing 
and banking contributes to U.S. investment in real 
estate abroad. Similarly, Hines (2001) document-
ed that as industrial and financial firms expand 
their operations overseas, they require properties 
(industrial, commercial, residential real estate) by 
acquisition or lease that fit their particular cor-
porate needs (such as carrying on their interna-
tional business and house their employees). He 
et al. (2009) also argued that foreign investors in 
real estate industry follow their customers (such 
as international business personnel) to the host 
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economies. In particular, they found that foreign 
investors were attracted to China’s real estate 
industry due to the demand created by foreign 
enterprises. Likewise, Bardhan and Kroll (2007) 
noted that major U.S. real estate service firms and 
residential real estate brokerage firms follow U.S. 
multinational companies in developing countries 
in order to provide residential real estate servic-
es for expatriate population. He and Zhu (2010) 
found that foreign direct investors in real estate 
sector favored Chinese cities with more interna-
tional tourists and more foreign investments. It 
is because both international tourists and foreign 
managers in foreign companies prefer to stay in 
hotels or apartments that provide offices (or easy 
access to them), accommodation, and eating facili-
ties meeting Western standards. Information on 
this variable is taken from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
Finally, a number of researchers found that 
heightening property prices in the host countries 
attract foreign investment in real estate sector (He 
et al. 2009; Zhu et al. 2006). For example, in their 
financial model for foreign real estate investment 
in Spain, Rodríguez and Bustillo (2010) found that 
there is a long-run and positive relationship be-
tween expectations of increasing prices for real 
estate assets and foreign real estate investments 
in Spain. In particular, they argued that Spain is 
attractive for real estate investment because the 
future return of the present investment is expect-
ed to be high. Similarly, He et al. (2009) showed 
that the heightening housing prices significantly 
stimulate the inflow of FDI in China’s real estate 
industry. They argued that foreign investors in 
real estate lean towards those (China) provinces 
with higher average housing prices. JLL (2009b) 
stated that potential for capital growth is one of 
the main criteria for long term investors in Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA) countries’ real 
estate sectors. As a proxy for property prices, we 
use housing price index (2010 = 100) provided by 
the Global Market Information Databases (GMID). 
A summary of variables used in the present study 
is given in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of 
variables are given in Appendix C. 
5. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS  
The aim of this study is to investigate the rela-
tionship between RET and FREI after controlling 
for some other relevant variables. Given the ear-
lier discussion, the following panel data model is 
specified:
lnFREIit = β0 + β1 lnRETit + β2 lnGDPcapit +  
β3 lnINFRASit + β4 lnFINCit + β5 lnFDIit +  
β6 lnPPRICit + vi + eit, (1)
where: FREIit stands for FDI in real estate in 
country i and period t; RETit stands for real estate 
transparency in country i and period t; GDPcapit 
represents the market size in country i and pe-
riod t; INFRASit denotes the level of infrastructure 
in country i and period t; FINCit is the financing 
costs for country i and period t; FDIit represents 
foreign investments in other sectors in country i 
and period t; PPRICit denotes the property price 
for country i and period ti, vi is country fixed-effect 
and eit is an error term. We use the logarithm for 
all variables. There are three main reasons that 
we use logarithm for variables. First, positive vari-
Table 2. Description of variables
Variable Description Source Expected sign 
FREI Aggregate FDI inflows to real estate sector Various sources (see Appendix B)
RET Real estate transparency Jones Lang LaSalle + or –
CC Control of corruption (Transparency)  Worldwide Governance Indicators of 
the World Bank 
+ or –
GDPcap GDP per capita (market size) World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
+
INFRAS Internet user – per 1000 people (Infrastructure) World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 
+
ROAD Density of road network (Infrastructure) Global Market Information Databases +
FINC Annual lending rate (Financing costs) International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics
–
FDI Foreign direct investments in other sector World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators
+
PPRIC Housing price index Global Market Information Databases + 
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able often are heteroskedastic or skewed; taking 
the logarithm can mitigate, if not eliminate, both 
problems. Second, taking logarithm usually nar-
rows the range of the variable. This makes esti-
mates less sensitive to outlying observations on 
the dependent or independent variables. Third, 
using logarithm leads to coefficients with appeal-
ing interpretation, and we can be ignorant about 
the units of measurement of variables appearing 
in logarithmic form because the slope coefficients 
are invariant to rescaling (Wooldridge 2009: 191).
In the present study, panel data regressions 
are applied to estimate the relationships between 
the explanatory variables and FREI. We employ 
two different econometric techniques, a country 
fixed-effect model4 and the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator. Generally, fixed-effect 
estimator is used to capture unobserved country 
specific effects and it also produces consistent es-
timates. In other words, the panel data analysis 
with country fixed-effect approach allows us to dis-
tinguish more systematically between the effects 
of RET and other variables on FREI over time as 
well as across countries. 
The results of the equation (1) using fixed-ef-
fect estimation approach are reported in column 
1 of Table 3. The results suggest that there is no 
significant relationship between RET and FREI. 
The finding indicates that a rise in transparency 
in real estate markets do not lead to a significant 
increase in foreign investments in real estate in 
the sample countries. Thus, RET is not a critical 
factor in determining the level of FREI. This result 
does not provide support for previous studies (e.g. 
Schulte et al. 2005; Triantafyllopoulos 2006). How-
ever, this outcome is consistent with JLL (2008) 
which found that the relationship between RET 
and FREI is not strong. One reason for this result 
can be explained by Egger and Winner (2005)’s 
findings. They found that corruption and lack of 
transparency are stimulus for foreign investments 
because these factors can be beneficial in circum-
venting regulatory and administrative restrictions. 
4 Two important panel models that consider the unobserved 
effects (or fixed effects) are the fixed-effect and the random-
effect methods. The fixed-effect estimator uses a transfor-
mation to remove the unobserved effect prior to estimation. 
Any time constant explanatory variables are removed along 
with the unobserved effect. The random-effects estimator is 
applicable when we think the unobserved effect is uncorre-
lated with all the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009). 
In order to determine which model is preferred for the equa-
tion estimation, a Hausman test is used. The Hausman 
Chi-square statistic is significant at the 5% level indicating 
that the random-effect model is inconsistent and fixed-effect 
model is preferred to estimate the equation (1) in the present 
study. 
Second, the role of RET may be lessen by other lo-
cation factors such as property prices and market 
size. Third, high level of RET may discourage those 
foreign speculators who seek local opportunities in 
the presence of asymmetric information. Finally, 
it can be argued that sometimes investors locate 
their real estate investments in low transparency 
countries because they expect higher returns for 
that investment, a factor that could explain the 
lack of influence of transparency over FREI.   
Moreover, our results indicate that GDP per 
capita (proxy for market size) is positive and sig-
nificant suggesting that larger market size attract 
greater amount of FREI. This result is consistent 
with He et al. (2009) who found that GDP per cap-
ita is a significant determinant of FREI. Further-
more, the findings provide evidence that FDI is 
positively and statistically associated with FREI, 
indicated by an estimated coefficient that is signifi-
cant at the 1% level. In other words, countries with 
higher level of FDI in other sectors attract greater 
amounts of FREI. This argument is in accordance 
with He and Zhu (2010). The coefficient for proper-
ty prices (PPRIC) has positive sign, meaning that 
an increase in this factor is positively associated 
with higher FREI. This result is consistent with 
Rodríguez and Bustillo (2010) and He et al. (2009) 
who found that property price is one of the major 
determinants of FREI. Finally, INFRAS and FINC 
have the expected signs but not significant.  
So far, it is assumed that the RET and the 
control variables are exogenous (variables that 
are not correlated with the residuals). However, 
in some cases this is obviously an unrealistic as-
sumption. For example, greater amount of foreign 
investments in real estate contribute to economic 
development and higher level of GDP (e.g. Ning, 
Yu 2009). Likewise, higher number of internation-
al participants in host countries’ real estate mar-
ket may intensify the pressure on transparency 
standards. The standard approach in cases where 
right-hand side variables are correlated with the 
residuals (or endogeneity problem) is to estimate 
the equation using instrumental variables regres-
sion, particularly the GMM. 
Another econometric problem is that time-se-
ries regression analysis may involve autocorrela-
tion of the disturbances or serial correlation. We 
can solve this econometric problem (autocorrela-
tion) by including the lagged dependent variable 
on the right hand side of the regression equations 
(Busse, Hefeker 2007). In doing so, by using lagged 
FREI in the equation, the econometric specifica-
tion will be changed to a dynamic panel. A usual 
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method for dynamic panels is the GMM estima-
tor. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and 
Bover (1995) suggested first-differencing the model 
to eliminate the unobserved effects and then using 
valid instruments to deal with the problem of the 
new error term being correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. 
A drawback of the difference GMM is that when 
first differences are taken, time-invariant vari-
ables are removed. Therefore, the first difference 
GMM does not use the cross-sectional information 
reflected in the differences between countries. An-
other disadvantage of first difference GMM is that 
lagged levels are often poor instruments for the 
equation in difference, which can lead to poor pre-
cision in the estimators. To mitigate this problem, 
a new estimator is used, namely, the system GMM, 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998). This estimator is based on 
an augmented system that includes the regression 
in differences and in addition to the regression in 
the levels with lagged differences as instruments 
(Bajo-Rubio et al. 2010). Thus, we use the system 
GMM estimator to investigate the relationships 
between explanatory variables and FREI. 
The use of valid instruments is required in 
order to control for the potential endogeneity of 
the other explanatory variables. The consistency 
of the GMM estimator depends on the validity 
of the instruments, which is examined by means 
of two specifications tests (Arellano, Bond 1991). 
First, the Sargan test statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions (that tests the hypothesis that the in-
strument variables are not correlated with the re-
siduals). The validity of the instrument variables 
should not be rejected by Sargan test. Second, we 
need to test the null hypothesis of no second-or-
der correlation in the residuals (Bajo-Rubio et al. 
2010). In order to have consistent GMM estima-
tors, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial 
correlation should not be rejected.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents the results of 
the GMM system regression. Similar to the fixed-
effect regression, we find that RET is not a major 
determinant of FREI, as its coefficient is not sta-
tistically significant. The results for GDPcap and 
FDI are in line with those of the fixed-effect panel 
regression, as these two variables are significant 
and have an identical positive sign. In addition, 
the result for PPRIC indicates that this variable 
is positively associated with FREI in a dynamic 
panel setting. On the other hand, FINC and IN-
FRAS are not significant determinants of FREI 
in sample countries. The Sargan test (p-value = 
0.7167) shows that the applied instruments are 
valid (see Table 3). The residuals also do not ex-
hibit second-order serial correlation, as shown by 
an insignificant p-value of AR (2). Thus, neither of 
the test statistics leads us to reject the assumption 
of consistency of the GMM estimator. 
Table 3. Regression results 











































RET × lnGDPcap – – 0.3928**
(2.3262)
Adjusted R-Square 0.3007 – –
Test p-values 
Sargan Test – 0.7167 0.6502
AR(2) – 0.3520 0.3301
Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1%; t-values reported in parentheses.
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Therefore, the combined evidence (fixed-effect 
and the GMM regressions) suggests that RET does 
not contribute to the higher level of FREI in the 
sample countries.
Finally, we examine whether RET interacts 
with per capita income (GDPcap) to affect FREI. 
In other words, we test jointly whether RET and 
GDPcap variables affect FREI by themselves or 
through the interaction term. Such specification 
is adopted in model (2). This specification is mo-
tivated by findings of Kolstad and Villager (2008) 
who found that political economy determinants of 
FDI impact groups of countries in term of income 
differently. 
lnFREIit = β0 + β1 lnRETit + β2 lnGDPcapit +  
β3 lnRETit × lnGDPcapit + β4 lnINFRASit + β5 
lnFINCit + β6 lnFDIit + β7 lnPPRICit + vi + eit. (2)
As can be seen in Column 3 of Table 3, the 
GMM regression results show that the coefficient 
for RET is negative and insignificant, while the in-
teraction term (lnRET × lnGDPcap) is positive sug-
gesting the higher the level of income in the host 
country, the higher the effect of RET on FREI. It 
means that RET can brings more FREI in richer 
countries. 
Figure 2 shows the RET and FREI trends in 
the same graph for some countries under study. As 
can be seen, the association is not clearly positive 
or negative. The inconclusive relationship confirms 
our findings which there is not a significant rela-
tionship between RET and FREI. 
Finally, we run more regressions to ensure the 
robustness of our findings. We consider different 
proxy for RET and infrastructure. The alternative 
proxy for RET is control of corruption (CC) which 
is provided by the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors of the World Bank. The score for this indicator 
ranges from –2.5 (worst performance) to 2.5 (best 
performance). CC captures perceptions of the ex-
tent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of cor-
ruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. The alternative proxy for 
physical infrastructure is density of road network 
(ROAD). Density of road network is total length, in 
kilometres, of motorways, highways/main/national 
roads, secondary/regional roads and other roads, 
divided by the area of the country in sq km. The 
data for density of road network are obtained from 
Global Market Information Databases. As can be 
seen from Appendix D, the results are unchanged 
and robust to the inclusion of the alternative proxy 
for RET and infrastructure. The coefficients for CC 
and ROAD are statistically insignificant.
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Several researchers have studied the relation-
ship between real estate transparency (RET) and 
foreign real estate investments (FREI). The con-
clusions are contradictory: one set of researchers 
support a positive relationship between RET and 
FREI; and the second view argue that the rela-
tionship is insignificant or negative. While there 
has been a series of conceptual and cross-sectional 
studies published in this area, very few empirical 
works have examined the effects of RET on FREI 
by applying a panel data approach.  
In this study, we empirically investigate the re-
lationship between RET and FREI for 32 countries 
covering 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Applying fixed-
effect and GMM estimation approaches, the results 
show that higher level of RET could not contribute 
to the expansion of FREI in the sample countries. 
However, we find that the effect of RET on FREI 
is dependent on its interaction with the level of in-
come. Moreover, our results indicate that foreign 
real estate investors favor those countries with 
larger market size, higher level of foreign invest-
ments in other sectors and higher property prices. 
While higher level of RET appears not to be as-
sociated with more FREI, our results, of course, 
should not be interpreted as support for opaque 
real estate markets. In contrast, improvements in 
RET should be considered by policymakers because 
transparent markets can eliminate the specula-
tions in real estate markets (which has several 
negative consequences for national economies such 
as property bubble and financial crisis). Moreover, 
in order to attract higher level of FREI, policymak-
ers should enhance real estate transparency along 
the economic development.  
Ultimately, the results of the study should be 
considered in light of its limitations, which also 
point to some issues for future research. First, the 
present study only considered the aggregate FREI 
for analysis. For future research, it may be use-
ful to examine the relationship between RET and 
FREI by using disaggregate data for various types 
of properties such as residential, commercial and 
industrial. Second, using just 32 countries for 4 
years is one of the study’s limitations. Given the 
data constraints, results should be viewed with 
caution and hence, data from more countries and 
longer period is needed to fully investigate the re-
lationship between RET and FREI.
328 M. R. Farzanegan, H. Gholipour Fereidouni

































































































































































Malaysia  Turkey 
329Does real estate transparency matter for foreign real estate investments?
REFERENCES
Adair, A.; Allen, S.; Berry, J.; McGreal, S. 2006. Central 
and Eastern European property investment markets: 
issues of data and transparency, Journal of Property 
Investment & Finance 24(3): 211–220. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1108/14635780610659928
Arellano, M.; Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specifica-
tion for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations, Review of 
Economic Studies 58(2): 277–297. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/2297968
Arellano, M.; Bover, O. 1995. Another look at the in-
strumental variable estimation of error-components 
models, Journal of Econometrics 68(1): 29–51. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D
Bajo-Rubio, O.; Díaz-Mora, C.; Díaz-Roldán, C. 2010. For-
eign direct investment and regional growth: an anal-
ysis of the Spanish case, Regional Studies 44(3): 373–
382. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343400802508844
Baltagi, B. H. 2005. Econometric analysis of panel data. 
3 ed. England: Willey.
Bardhan, A.; Kroll, C. A. 2007. Globalization and the 
real estate industry: issues, implications, opportu-
nities, in Sloan industry studies annual conference, 
April 2007, Cambridge. 
Blundell, R.; Bond, S. 1998. Initial conditions and mo-
ment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, 
Journal of Econometrics 87(1): 115–143. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8  
Brown, G. R.; Matysiak, G. A. 2000. Real estate invest-
ment: a capital market approach. Singapore: Finan-
cial Times Prentice Hall.
Busse, M.; Hefeker, C. 2007. Political risk, institutions 
and foreign direct investment, European Journal 
of Political Economy 23(2): 397–415. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.02.003 
Chakrabarti, A. 2001. The determinants of foreign di-
rect investment: sensitivity analyses of cross-country 
regressions, KYKLOS 54(1): 89–114. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/1467-6435.00142
Chin,W.; Dent, P.; Roberts, C. 2006. An exploratory 
analysis of barriers to investment and market matu-
rity in Southeast Asian cities, Journal of Real Estate 
Portfolio Management 12(1): 49–58.
Choi, C. 2003. Does the Internet stimulate inward for-
eign direct investment?, Journal of Policy Modeling 
25(4): 319–326. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0161-
8938(02)00202-8
Cordero, J.; Paus, E. 2008. Foreign investment and eco-
nomic development in Costa Rica: the unrealized 
potential, Working Group on Development and Envi-
ronment in the Americas: Discussion paper Number 
13, April 2008.
D’Arcy, E. 2009. The evolution of institutional arrange-
ments to support the internationalization of real es-
tate involvements: some evidence from Europe, Jour-
nal of European Real Estate Research 2(3): 280–293. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17539260911000006
Dhar, R.; Goetzmann, W. N. 2006. Institutional perspec-
tives on real estate investing: the role of risk and 
uncertainty, Journal of Portfolio Management 32: 
106–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2006.644202
Drabek, Z.; Payne, W. 2002. The impact of transparency 
on foreign direct investment, Journal of Economic In-
tegration 17(4): 777–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/
jei.2002.17.4.777
Egger, P.; Winner, H. 2003. Does contract risk impede 
foreign direct investment?, Swiss Journal of Econom-
ics and Statistics 139: 155–172.  
Egger, P.; Winner, H. 2005. Evidence on corruption as 
an incentive for foreign direct investment, European 
Journal of Political Economy 21: 932–952. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.01.002 
Eichholtz, P. M. A.; Gugler, N.; Kok, N. 2011. Trans-
parency, integration, and the cost of international 
real estate investments, Journal of Real Estate Fi-
nance and Economics 43: 152–173. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s11146-010-9244-5
Eichholtz, P. M. A.; Koedijk, K.; Schweitzer, M. 2001. 
Global property investment and the costs of inter-
national diversification, Journal of International 
Money and Finance 20(3): 349–366. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0261-5606(01)00004-3
Falkenbach, H. 2009. Market selection for internation-
al real estate investments, International Journal 
of Strategic Property Management 13(4): 299–308. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1648-715X.2009.13.299-308
Gelos, R. G.; Wei, S. J. 2002. Transparency and inter-
national investor behavior, Working Paper 9260, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, October 2002. 
Geurts, T. G.; Jaffe, A. J. 1996. Risk and real estate 
investment: an international perspective, Journal of 
Real Estate Research 11(2): 117–130. 
Han, F. 2005. Creating transparency in the Chinese real 
estate development industry: a case study: Master 
thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
He, C.; Wang, J.; Cheng, S. 2009. What attracts foreign 
direct investment in China’s real estate develop-
ment?, Annals of Regional Science 46(2): 267–293. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00168-009-0341-4
He, C.; Zhu, Y. 2010. Real estate FDI in Chinese cit-
ies: local market conditions and regional institutions, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51(3): 360–384. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.51.3.360
Hines, M. A. 2001. Investing in international real estate. 
USA: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
JLL 2004. Real estate transparency index 2004. Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2006. Real estate transparency index 2006. Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2007. On point. European capital markets bulletin 
2007 and views of 2008. Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2008. Real estate transparency index 2008. Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2009a. On point. Dubai city profile, October 2009. 
Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2009b. Pules, MENA house view, September 2009. 
Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL).
JLL 2010. Real estate transparency index 2010. Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL).
Lall, P.; Norman, D. W.; Featherstone, A. M. 2003. De-
terminants of US direct foreign investment in the 
Caribbean, Applied Economics 35(13): 1485–1496. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0003684032000100382
330 M. R. Farzanegan, H. Gholipour Fereidouni
Lee, S. L. 2001. The risks of investing in the real estate 
markets of the Asian region, Working Paper, Univer-
sity of Reading.
Kolstad, I.; Villanger, E. 2008. Determinants of foreign 
direct investment in services, European Journal 
of Political Economy 24(2): 518–533. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.09.001
Moshirian, F.; Pham, T. 2000. Determinants of US in-
vestment in real estate abroad, Journal of Multina-
tional Financial Management 10(1): 63–72. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1042-444X(99)00019-5
Ning, J.; Yu, B. 2009. The analysis on FDI’s technology 
spillover based on industrial relationship: China’s 
real estate industry as an example, in Proceedings 
of 2009 International Conference on Construction & 
Real Estate Management, 05–06 November 2009, 
Beijing, China, vols 1 and 2, 1266–1269.
Ramasamy, B.; Yeung, M. 2010. The determinants of 
foreign direct investment in services, World Econo-
my 33(4): 573–596. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9701.2009.01256.x
Renaud, B. 2010. Dubai’s real estate boom and bust of 
2002–2008: dynamics and policy responses, Housing 
Finance International 2010(Summer): 6–17.
Rodríguez, C.; Bustillo, R. 2010. Modeling foreign real 
estate investment: the Spanish case, Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics 41(3): 354–367. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9164-9
Schulte, K. W.; Rottke, N.; Pitschke, C. 2005. Transpar-
ency in the German real estate market, Journal of 
Property Investment & Finance 23(1): 90–108. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/14635780510575111
Seyoum, B. 2009. An empirical analysis of the impact of 
corporate transparency on foreign direct investment, 
Multinational Business Review 17(3): 29–48. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/1525383X200900016
Seyoum, B.; Manyak, T. G. 2009. The impact of public 
and private sector transparency on foreign direct in-
vestment in developing countries, Critical Perspec-
tives on International Business 5(3): 187–206. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/17422040910974686 
Topintzi, E.; Chin, H.; Hobbs, P. 2008. Moving towards 
a global real estate index, Journal of Property In-
vestment & Finance 26(4): 286–303. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1108/14635780810886654
Transparency International 2008. Annual Report 2008. 
Available at: http://www.transparency.org/publica-
tions/annual_report
Triantafyllopoulos, N. 2006. Public sector transparency 
and tourism real estate investments in Greece, Re-
gional and Sectoral Economic Studies 6(2): 57–72. 
UNCTAD 2003. World investment report 2003: FDI poli-
cies for development, national and international per-
spective. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), New York. 
UNCTAD 2004. World investment report 2004: the shift 
towards services. United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Geneva. 
UNCTAD 2007. World investment report 2007: transna-
tional corporations, extractive industries and devel-
opment. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Geneva.
Wooldridge, J. M. 2009. Introductory econometrics: a 
modern approach. 4th ed. Canada: South-Western, 
Cengage Learning.
Zhao, H. 2003. Country factor differentials as determi-
nants of FDI flow to China, Thunderbird Interna-
tional Business Review 45(2): 149–169. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1002/tie.10067
Zhu, J.; Sim, L.; Zhang, X. 2006. Global real estate in-
vestments and local cultural capital in the making 
of Shanghai’s new office locations, Habitat Inter-
national 30(3): 462–481. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
habitatint.2004.12.003
APPENDIX A
FDI in Real Estate (FREI) and its proportion of GDP from Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 
(GDPrrb) (millions of US dollars) (Various sources, see Appendix B)
Country 2001 2004 2007
FREI FREI/GDPrrb FREI FREI/GDPrrb FREI FREI/GDPrrb
Hungary 71.8 0.009 285.3 0.019 649.3 0.030
Malaysia 75.38 0.018 159.19 0.033 398.73 0.048
Poland 126.5 0.005 844.2 0.028 2,363.4 0.046
Denmark 24.3 0.0009 324.7 0.008 1493.3 0.029
Slovakia 55.8 0.013 157.8 0.022 601 0.057
Greece 0.5 0.000 8.4 0.0002 149.8 0.003
Turkey  0 0.000 40 0.0008 449 0.004
Czech 256 0.032 656.3 0.049 1680 0.075
China 5136.5 0.044 5950.15 0.034 17 088.7 0.050
France 1997.1 0.006 2614 0.005 6302.5 0.009




Austria, Belgium, Czech, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherland, Norway, Po-
land, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Korea, 
Sweden, Turkey, UK, USA
OECD Statistics, Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics, 
available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
China National Bureau of Statistics of China, available at: http://www.stats.
gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/  
Israel Accountant General’s Office, Ministry of Finance, available at: http://
www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pik_mth/pikmth_h.htm 
Romania, Thailand Thomson Reuters Datastream
Vietnam General Statistics Office of Vietnam, available at: http://www.gso.gov.
vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=471 
Taiwan Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs, available at: 
http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/english/home/English.aspx   
Costa Rica Cordero and Paus (2008), available at: http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/
rp/DP13Paus_CorderoApr08.pdf   
Malaysia Valuation and Property Services Department, Ministry of Finance, 
available at: http://www.jpph.gov.my/V2/index.php?versi=1 
APPENDIX C
Descriptive statistics (before taking logarithm)









Regression with alternative measure of transparency and infrastructure  











Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1%; t-values reported in parentheses.
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